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OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES: A
NEw ERA OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
Seema G. Sharma*
ABSTRACT
On July 21, 2010, President Barack H. Obama signed into law financial
reform legislation titled the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010," also known as the "Dodd-Frank Act of
2010," (the "Dodd-Frank Act").' After almost two years of intensely con-
tentious legislative process, the U.S. Congress passed this new legislation in
response to the financial crisis of 2008.2 The Dodd-Frank Act is the most
sweeping legislation affecting the nation's financial regulations since the
Depression-era laws and is intended to restore confidence in U.S. financial
markets and stimulate growth in the economy.3 The new law puts U.S.
banks and financial markets under tighter government control by ex-
panding the regulatory reach of the major federal agencies." It also sets
new international standards for transparency in the financial markets and
lays the foundation to build a stronger global financial infrastructure.5 Of
the sixteen distinct Titles of the Dodd-Frank Act on a variety of topics, this
paper will provide analysis and critique of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank
Act. Title VII is referred to as the Wall Street Transparency and Accounta-
bility Act of 2010 (referred to herein as the "the Act"), and provides a
comprehensive framework for the regulation of OTC derivatives.6 The
* Associate Executive Director and Research Fellow at the SMU Institute of Inter-
national Banking and Finance. Portions of this article are related to Ms. Sharma's
ongoing research on derivatives. Special thanks to Professor Joseph J. Norton of
SMU Dedman School of Law for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
At the time of writing this article, December 31, 2010, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are busy formulating comprehensive regulations as to Title VII.
1. Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,




2. V. Gerard Comizio, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: Impact on Industrial Loan Banks, CLIENr ALERT (Paul Hastings), (July
2010), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1666.pdf.
3. Id.; H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://docs.house.gov/rules/finserv/
111 hr finsrv.pdf.
4. Comizio, supra note 2, at 101.
5. Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Enacted Into Law on July 21, 2010, supra note 1.
6. The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, CLIENT PUBLICA-
TION (Shearman & Sterling LLP), (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.shearman.com/files/
Publication/212cd5f0-44fb-45c9-9f97-51ccde55cb59/Presentation/PublicationAt-
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goal of Title VII is to bring transparency and accountability to the deriva-
tives market by mandating centralized clearing of OTC derivatives and
their trading on or through designated contract markets, national securities
exchanges, or swap execution facilities.] Needless to say, the provisions of
the Act will change the style of derivatives trading in the United States for-
ever.8 With New York being the major financial center in the Western
hemisphere, the Americas will not be able to escape the impact of the new
law, as the requirements of the Act will also apply to foreign entities deal-
ing with the U.S. market participants or executing or clearing their swap
transactions through a U.S. facility.9 Hence, a serious consideration of the
provisions of Title VII is critical to fully comprehend its implications.
Though at this point it is hard to predict the full scope of the Act, there is
no doubt that the effects of the reform process will be profound. After
examining the role of derivatives in the financial crisis and a detailed analy-
sis of the aforementioned and other key provisions of Title VII, the paper
concludes that the transparency in the derivatives markets that will result
from the use of clearinghouses, exchange trading, and public reporting of
trades, will make the U.S. financial markets stronger than ever.
I. INTRODUCTIONA S the U.S. economy experienced the worst economic nightmare
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, derivatives10 were
targeted for increasing systemic risk" in the financial system.12
Credit Default Swaps (CDS), a type of the over-the-counter derivative
(OTC derivative), was at the forefront, and was blamed for being the lead
financial product that "contributed to the overall tightening in the credit
markets following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near-col-






10. Derivatives include exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) contracts. Kris-
tina Zucchi, Derivatives 101, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ar-
ticles/optioninvestor/10/derivatives-101.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
Standardized derivatives are typically traded on exchanges which publicly display
prices and customized derivatives products are traded off-exchange or over-the-
counter where prices remain private. Id.
11. Systemic risk is the risk that failure of a firm or disruptions in a market will extend
to other firms or in other market segments and destabilize the financial system as
whole. Systematic Risk, INVESTOPEDIA.coM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
s/systematicrisk.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
12. See generally Robert E. Litan, The Derivatives Dealer's Club and Derivatives Mar-
kets Reform: A Guide for Policy Makers, Citizens and Other Interested Parties,




seller."' 3 The call for greater transparency and reform of the derivatives
market sparked the debate for comprehensive supervision and regulation
of the OTC derivatives markets.14 Responding to the call, the Obama
Administration released its proposal in June 2009.15 Following the Ad-
ministration's Proposal, the 111th Congress considered several legislative
proposals to reform the regulation of financial markets and financial in-
stitutions.16 The goal for the new financial regulatory reform legislation
was, among other things, to bring order and stability to the U.S. financial
system. 7 For the derivatives world, it meant sweeping changes to the
OTC derivatives market and industry.' 8 The process for reform of the
financial system that began in the summer of 2008 culminated on July 21,
2010, with the enactment of the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act" (the "Dodd-Frank Act").19 Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Act, entitled "Wall Street Transparency and Accountability
Act of 2010," (the "Act"), deals with the regulation of derivatives market
and industry.20 Under the new regime, the world of OTC derivatives has
13. Orice M. Williams, Systemic Risk: Regulatory Oversight and Recent Initiatives to
Address Risk Posed by Credit Default Swaps, GAO-09-397T 2009, U.S. Gov'T Ac-
COUNTABIL.lIY OivrcE, (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09397t.pdf.
14. See Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Super-
vision and Regulation, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 2 (June 17, 2009), http://www.
financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReportweb.pdf.
15. See generally id.
16. See generally BAIRD WEDEL ET AL., FINANCIAL RELGULATORiY REiFORM AN) TIHE
111Ti- CONGREss, Congressional Research Service R40975 (2010), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40975_20100331.pdf.
17. Comizio, supra note 2, at 101.
18. See The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, supra note 6, at
1.
19. The new legislation is a compromise crafted from measures passed separately by
the House and Senate under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2009, (House bill, H.R. 4173), and the Restoring Financial Stability Act of
2010, (Senate bill, S. 3217), respectively. The House of Representatives passed
H.R. 4173 on December 11, 2009, by a vote of 223-202. The Senate considered S.
3217 through April and May 2010. On May 20, 2010, the Senate finished the
amendment process to S. 3217, substituted this bill as amended into H.R. 4317, and
passed the Senate version of H.R. 4173 by a vote of 59-39. To reconcile differences
between the two bills passed by the House and Senate, a Conference Committee
was appointed which convened its first meeting on June 10, 2010. The Conference
Committee presented its report on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, which was sent to both houses of Congress for further con-
sideration. The House gave its approval to the report on June 30, 2010, and the
Senate approved it on July 15, 2010. The approved bill was sent to the White
House for enactment and President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law
on July 21, 2010. See Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009-2010) H.R.4173,
Ti tom As (Library of Cong.), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d111:H.R.4173: (last visited Feb. 9, 2011); Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78a).
20. See generally William F. Kroener Ill, Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Its Impact
on the Banking Industry: Derivates Reforms A LI-A BA Course of Study, SULLIVAN
& CROMWEILL LLP, (Oct. 7, 2010), http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/
skoobesruoc/pdflCS038_chapter_07-thumb.pdf.
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been divided into "swaps," 21 "security-based swaps," 22 and "mixed
swaps." 23 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have been given regulatory au-
thority to regulate "swaps" and "security-based swaps," respectively. 24
"Mixed swaps" will be regulated by both of the Commissions. 25 The two
Commissions have also been assigned the task of extensive rulemaking
for the implementation of the provisions of the Act.2 6 Additionally, they
will also be conducting a number of studies to assess the impact of certain
regulations and to bring about international harmonization of derivatives
markets.27 It is important to note that the Act allows an over-the-counter
market in non-standardized swaps to continue.28
The Dodd-Frank Act has significance not just for U.S. entities, but also
for non-U.S. entities, given the extraterritorial reach of its provisions. 29
Because of the importance of New York as the major financial center in
the Western hemisphere, a large number of entities from this side of the
hemisphere participate in the U.S. financial markets. Hence, it is critical
that they understand the implication of the new law on their businesses.
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act will have a substantial impact on non-
U.S. entities that engage in OTC derivatives transactions in the U.S. de-
rivatives markets.30 Under § 715 of the Act, the CFTC and SEC, in con-
sultation with the Treasury, have the authority to prohibit a non-resident
21. The Act defines "swap" very broadly as any agreement, contract, or transaction
that is an option for the purchase or sale, or is based on the value, of an underlying
financial or economic interest or property, or that provides for any purchase, sale,
payment, or delivery that is dependent on the occurrence, non-occurrence, or the
extent of the occurrence of an event associated with a potential financial, eco-
nomic, or commercial consequence. Dodd-Frank Act § 721 The definition of
"swap" includes interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, credit, equity, commod-
ity, weather, energy, metal, agricultural, and index swaps. Id. Excluded from the
definition are: "security-based swaps," exchange-traded futures, contracts for the
sale of commodities for future delivery (or options thereon), physically settled for-
wards (and options thereon), and exchange-traded options on currencies and cer-
tain securities contracts. Id.
22. A security-based swap is a "swap" based on a narrow-based security index (includ-
ing an interest therein or on the value thereof), a single security or loan (including
an interest therein or on the value thereof), or the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or
the extent of the occurrence of an event relating to a single issuer or narrow group
of issuers in a narrow-based security-index, provided that such event directly af-
fects the financials of the issuer. Options, forwards, and credit default swaps refer-
encing corporate bonds and loans are included. Id.
23. A "mixed swap" has the characteristics of both "swap" and "security-based swap,"
such as a total return swap on a single security that also incorporates an FX hedge.
The CFTC and SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, will have joint rule-
making authority over mixed swaps. Id.
24. The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, supra note 6.
25. Dodd-Frank Act § 712(a)(8).
26. Id. § 712(d)(2).
27. Id. HW 712(f)(2), 752.
28. Reform of the Swaps Market Under the Dodd-Frank Act Cravath, SWAINE &
Moom, LLP, (2010), http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publica-
tions/Dodd-Frank %20(Reform %20of%20the%2OSwaps%2OMarket).pdf.
29. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 715, 722(d).
30. Reform of the Swaps Market Under the Dodd-Frank Act Cravath, supra note 28.
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company from participating in swap activities in the United States if they
determine that the regulation of swaps in the company's country under-
mines the stability of the U.S. financial system. 31 Further, new swap laws:
[s]hall not apply to swap activities taking place outside the United
States unless those activities (1) have a direct and significant connec-
tion with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States, or
(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe or promulgate as are necessary or appropriate to prevent eva-
sion of. . .the Dodd-Frank Act.32
Most importantly, the Act does not provide any express exemptions for
non-U.S. entities from the requirements applicable to swap dealers or
major swap participants. 33 Hence, depending upon the level of their ac-
tivity in the United States, non-U.S. entities might be subject to regula-
tion as swap dealers or major swap participants. 34 The implication of this
for such entities is significant, thus it is in their interest to comply with the
law. Additionally, until such time that the Commissions promulgate final
rules, these entities should apply caution while conducting their deriva-
tives activities to avoid potential violation of the new legislation.
This article examines derivatives, their role in the financial crisis, and
discusses key provisions of the new regulatory regime established under
the Act in order to evaluate its impact on the OTC derivatives and their
markets. Part II provides a brief description of derivatives financial in-
struments and the structure of the markets in which they are traded. Part
III examines the role of derivatives in the financial crisis of 2008. Part IV
discusses key provisions of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act and their
impact on the OTC derivatives market and its participants. The article, in
Part V, concludes that while regulation of OTC derivatives will bring
transparency and efficiency to the market, there remains work to be done
to harmonize the rules on an international scale to prevent migration of
business overseas. Centralized clearing, exchange trading, reporting of
uncleared swaps to swap repositories, and heightened business conduct
requirements will ensure success of the objectives of the legislation and
make our financial markets stronger than ever.
II. DERIVATIVES AND THEIR MARKET STRUCTURE
A. DERIVATIVES GENERALLY
Derivatives, such as futures, options, and swaps, are financial instru-
ments whose value is based on or derived from other assets or variables.35
The underlying asset may be anything from stock and bonds, to commod-
ities, interest rates, currency rates, or an index of a leading stock mar-
31. Dodd-Frank Act § 715.
32. Id. § 722(d).
33. See Kroener, supra note 20.
34. See id.
35. See Zucchi, supra note 10.
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ket. 3 6 Hence, these contracts are of no value by themselves, but, "rather,
receive their value from movements in interest rates, the outcome of spe-
cific events, or the price of underlying assets like debt or equities."37 De-
rivatives contracts have also been defined as "a form of price guarantee:
an agreement between a future buyer and a future seller for something at
some designated point in time."38 An interesting aspect of derivatives is
that although they are primarily used as invaluable tools of risk-manage-
ment, they are also used for speculation, i.e. placing bets on the value of
the underlying asset based on the investors' assessment of the market-
movement, without ever owning tangible assets in that market.39
Derivatives transactions "allow market participants, including com-
modity producers, processers, and end-users, as well as corporations,
banks and governmental entities, to manage financial risks caused by
fluctuating interest rates, currencies, commodity prices and securities
prices."40 To manage their risks effectively and efficiently, market par-
ticipants use standard and customized derivatives contracts. Standard-
ized derivatives contracts are liquid contracts that are traded on
exchanges. 41 Futures and Options are good examples of the exchange-
traded financial derivatives, however, the more popular derivatives are
the ones that are not traded on an exchange, but those traded off the
exchange, known as "over-the-counter" (OTC) derivatives. 42 These OTC
derivatives contracts are customized contracts that are tailored to the spe-
cific needs of the counterparties, and include negotiated terms, such as
amounts, payment timing, and interest or currency rates.43 Because OTC
contracts are customized and tailored to meet the requirement of the
trading parties, liquidity in the OTC markets can be low considering the
costs involved in finding trading partners willing to take the other side of
a desired transaction.44 Additionally, it is extremely difficult to exit posi-
tions in the over-the-counter contracts before the prescribed termination
date.45 But, the customized aspect of OTC contracts is one of the reasons
for its popularity, for it allows users achieve their precise risk-manage-
ment needs through hedging, thereby facilitating innovation and variation
in the products and making OTC derivatives valuable to business enti-
36. See id.
37. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Cri-
sis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 40 (2009).
38. John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct
Regulatory Intervention-A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 Buti. L.
Riev. 1371, 1373 (2008).
39. Id.
40. Letter from Robert G. Pickel, CEO, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, to David
Stawick, Sec'y, Commodity Futures & Trading Comm'n 2 (June 16, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdflISDA-Comment-Letter-HedgeExemp.pdf.
41. See Zucchi, supra note 10.
42. Id.
43. Id.




ties. 46 The other reason for their popularity is that reporting, standardi-
zation and margin requirements that apply to exchange-traded
derivatives, do not apply to them.4 7 As a result, OTC derivatives are con-
sidered cost-effective and the least burdensome, and thus are highly at-
tractive to the parties involved. The OTC derivatives market consists of
many variations on the basic derivative contracts of forwards, options,
and swaps and "is divided into five major categories: foreign currency
exchange contracts, interest rate contracts, equity-linked contracts, com-
modity contracts, and credit derivatives," of which credit default swaps is
the most popular product and is the one that brought the spotlight on
derivatives during the recent financial crisis.48
Dealers and End Users make OTC derivatives markets. 49 Dealers-
usually large banks, securities firms, insurance companies, or their affili-
ates-"are intermediaries; they act as principals who take sides in trans-
actions and earn. . .spreads if and when they find others to take the
opposite sides."50 A dealer's basic role is to facilitate the transaction in
exchange for financial gain in the form of a fee for executing the transac-
tion.51 Firms that use derivatives to manage (hedge) their financial risks
or to speculate are called end users, as they are the "final buyers and
sellers of risk." 52 Sophisticated investors, such as institutional investors,
government entities, corporate and hedge funds, are also end users of
derivatives that
[h]old large pools of intangible financial assets (loans, bonds, shares)
whose value they wish to protect, in the same way that the rest of the
world protects their buildings, their houses, their manufactures, their
oil, their other tangible possessions, and also hope to make a profit
out of them.53
With the help of derivatives, the end users are able to protect the value
of their assets and also make profit out o f them.
B. MARKET STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
Derivatives are traded in two kinds of markets: exchanges and OTC
markets.54 Exchanges are centralized markets that are subject to regula-
tion by a federal agency, such as the CFTC for futures contracts or the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Lynch, supra note 38, at 1376.
49. Norman M. Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 CowuM.
Bus. L. REv. 677, 717 (2002).
50. Id.
51. Thomas C. Singher, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Coop-
eration Offer a Viable Alternative to Congressional Action? 18 FORDHIAM INT'L L.J.
1397, 1405 (1995).
52. Feder, supra note 49, at 717.
53. Piuue R. Wooo, SET-OFF & NETTING, DERIVATIVES, CLEARING SYSTEMS, 199
(2nd ed. 2007).
54. See Zucchi, supra note 10.
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SEC for stock options.55 As a centralized facility, exchanges play a criti-
cal role in consolidating the bid (buy) and offer (sell) quotes and making
it available to all market participants so that they can buy as low or sell as
high as anyone else. 5 6 OTC markets, on the other hand, are for privately
negotiated bilateral contracts between the buyer and seller, which are not
traded on any exchange; hence, these markets are not regulated by any
agency. 57 Although participants in the OTC markets, such as banks or
bank holding company subsidiaries, are subject to regulation; state and
federal bank regulators regulate banks and the Federal Reserve regulates
bank holding companies.58 The SEC oversees a derivatives dealer who is
also a securities dealer.59 Hence, limited regulation in the OTC deriva-
tives markets along with the benefits that the OTC products offer, re-
sulted in the phenomenal growth of these markets in the past two
decades. Today, these markets are central to the trading of derivatives;
treasury bills and bonds, foreign exchange, corporate bonds, and common
stocks all trade over-the-counter.60
In derivatives markets, billions of contracts change hands making it ex-
tremely hard to assess the creditworthiness of a counterparty.61 As a re-
sult, such contracts contain significant potential credit risk. Derivatives
exchanges, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the Chi-
cago Board of Trade (CBOT), or the Chicago Board of Exchange
(CBOE), deal with the issue of credit risk by employing a clearinghouse,
which clears and handles post trade processing.62 The presence of a
clearinghouse in the transaction ensures payment and settlement to both
the parties.63 Typically, the transactions require posting of collateral or
margin by counterparties to help the clearinghouse manage the credit
risk.64 The margin accounts of the counterparties are marked-to-market
on a daily basis and the clearinghouse collects additional margin from
traders for any price movement.65 Furthermore, clearing members are
also subject to capital requirements of the clearinghouse. 66 The purpose
of these requirements is to protect a counterparty from potential losses
55. Preliminary Staff Report: Overview on Derivatives, FIN. CRIsis INQUIRY COMM'N,
7 (2010), http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0630-psr-derivative-overview.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8.
58. See Lynch, supra note 38, at 1380.
59. See generally id.
60. See Ren6 Stulz, Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking & Monetary Econ., Fisher
Coll. of Bus., Ohio State Univ., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th
Cong.: Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 (2009), available at
http://fisher.osu.edulfin/faculty/stulz/Written%20Testimony%20of%2ORene%20M
%20%20Stulz%20Revised.pdf [hereinafter Testimony Rend Stulz].
61. See Lynch, supra note 38, at 1380.
62. Preliminary Staff Report: Overview on Derivatives, supra note 55, at 8.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. RENA S. MILLER, KEY IssuES IN DERIVATIVE RiEFORM, Congressional Research
Service R40965, at 3 (2009).
66. Preliminary Staff Report: Overview on Derivatives, supra note 55, at 8.
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that might result from the other party's nonpayment. 67 Most importantly,
these requirements also prevent build up of large paper loss that could
damage the clearinghouse in case of default.68
By contrast, "In the OTC market.. .there is a network of dealers rather
than a centralized market place." 69 Firms that act as dealers stand ready
to take either long or short positions, and make money on spreads and
fees. 70 There is no clearinghouse to interpose itself between the dealer
and the end user: "The dealer absorbs the credit risk of customer default,
while the customer faces the risk of dealer default."7 While there is no
central counterparty involved in OTC transactions, OTC derivatives con-
tracts require collateral or margin, for protection from the risk of
counterparty default.7 2 As long as the requirements of margin and collat-
eral posting are fulfilled, the operations run smoothly, however, there is a
potential for large uncollateralized losses to build up in the OTC market
as collateral or margin requirements are not mandatory.73 A case in
point is AIG, "which wrote about $1.8 trillion worth of credit default
swaps guaranteeing payment if certain mortgage-backed securities de-
faulted or experienced other 'credit events,"' such as bankruptcy, obliga-
tion acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation or
moratorium, and restructuring-the six credit events provided under In-
ternational Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) definitions. 74 Not
only did AIG fail to post collateral when the credit quality of the underly-
ing securities (or AIG's own credit ratings) deteriorated, but the firm was
also able to avoid posting initial margin because of its triple-A rating.75
AIG could sidestep the collateral and margin requirements because the
structure of the OTC derivatives market allowed it. Given the size of
AIG's OTC derivatives position, there was grave danger to the stability
of the U.S. financial markets from the failure of the insurance giant and,
fearing the domino effect of AIG's bankruptcy, "the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury put tens of billions of dollars into AIG, the bulk of which
went to its derivatives counterparties" and contained the spillover.76 Al-
though derivatives were not the main cause of the crisis, flaws in their
market structure allowed for the buildup of systemic risk in the economy.
67. Id.
68. MILLER, supra note 65, at 3.
69. Id.
70. "In this kind of market, one would expect the dealers to be the most solid and
creditworthy financial institutions, and in fact the OTC market that has emerged is
dominated by two or three dozen firms-very large institutions like JP Morgan
Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and their foreign counterparts." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. ISDA's Master Agreement is a standard contract commonly used by deriva-
tives parties to document OTC derivative transactions.
75. MILLER, supra note 65, at 4.
76. Id.
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III. ROLE OF DERIVATIVES IN THE RECENT
FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. THE BUILDUP TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
There was no single factor that caused the financial crisis. To under-
stand the role played by derivatives in the crisis, it is important to com-
prehend the regulatory environment that contributed to the popularity of
derivatives and fostered the rapid growth of their markets. Although de-
rivatives markets in the United States date back to 1865, derivatives mar-
kets for financial instruments appeared in the 1970s. 77 The regulation of
derivatives began with the Grain Futures Act of 1921 (GFA), which regu-
lated grain futures contracts that were traded on exchanges.78 The cur-
rent federal law governing derivatives and derivatives markets is the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which was passed by the Congress in
1936 to prevent price manipulation, fraudulent activities of bucket
shops,79 and other trading abuses in the futures market.80 In 1971, the
Bretton Woods system (a system of fixed exchange rate between curren-
cies) collapsed and it fuelled the growth of the derivatives industry.81 Fu-
tures contracts on financial instruments were introduced to manage the
currency risk. As futures markets evolved and were dominated by fu-
tures based on financial products, there was a change in the composition
of market participants-farmers and commodity users were joined by
large financial institutions and the transactions became more complex. 82
An over-the-counter market for derivatives grew rapidly in 1980s, but de-
spite the exponential growth, there was still no legal definition of the
term "futures contract"-the CEA did not define it, nor did the numer-
ous amendments to it.83 The lack of a definition created uncertainty for
swaps and other OTC derivatives contracts that were similar to exchange-
traded futures in their economic function but were privately negotiated
between counterparties outside organized exchanges. 84 There was a po-
tential legal risk that they might be considered invalid and unenforceable,
as these contracts, if determined to be futures contracts, were violating
the CEA's requirement that futures be traded on an organized ex-
77. See DON CHANCE, ESSAYS IN DERIVATIVES 16 (2001) available at http://
huskyl.stmarys.ca/-gye/derivativeshistory.pdf.
78. This Act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Hill v. Wallace, 259
U.S. 44 (1922).
79. Bucket shops accept orders and sell a derivative interest in security or commodity
future, "but they do not execute the orders in the... market." The Commodity
Exchange Act: Legal & Regulatory Issues Remain, GAO/GGD-97-50, U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFRICE, 5 n.10 (1997) http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97050.pdf
[hereinafter GAO Report CEAI. In case of adverse price movement in the futures
market against the bucket shops, "they often close their doors or file for bank-
ruptcy protection, leaving uncoilectibie debts." Id.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Preliminary Staff Report: Overview on Derivatives, supra note 55, at 19.




change.85 In 1999, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets
(PWG) made recommendations to the Congress to resolve legal uncer-
tainties concerning OTC derivatives. 86 The group's recommendation was
to exclude from oversight certain bilateral transactions between sophisti-
cated counterparties and to eliminate impediments to clearing OTC de-
rivatives, which Congress accepted and implemented in the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), signed into law by Presi-
dent Clinton on December 21, 2000.87 The legislative purpose for enact-
ing the CFMA was
[t]o promote innovation for futures and derivatives and to reduce
systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain
futures and derivatives transactions; to reduce systemic risk and pro-
vide greater stability to markets during times of market disorder by
allowing the clearing of transactions in over-the-counter derivatives
through appropriately regulated clearing organizations; and to en-
hance the competitive position of [U.S.] financial institutions and fi-
nancial markets.88
The CFMA removed OTC derivatives transactions from the require-
ments of exchange-trading and clearing under the CEA as long as the
counterparties to the swaps were "eligible contract participants," i.e., had
in excess of $10 million in total assets.89 As a result, OTC derivatives
were exempt from the CEA's requirement for capital adequacy, clearing,
reporting, and disclosure or any other requirement that would have the
effect of regulating the market.90 The reasoning behind keeping the mar-
ket out of the reach of any regulation was that a vast majority of OTC
transactions were between sophisticated parties who were subject to
oversight by their appropriate regulators. 91 Additionally, it was felt that
the self-discipline of the private counterparties would be sufficient to
keep a check on the market and prevent systemic risk from building in
the financial system.92 The CFMA was successful in providing certainty
to the OTC derivatives and marked the beginning of the phenomenal
growth of OTC derivative markets as a result of the blanket exemp-
tions.93 Another interesting outcome of the new exemptions was that
85. HAL S. Scorr, TiH GO3AL FINANCIAL Ciusis 112 (2009).
86. See generally Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater
Attention on Systemic Risk, GAO/GGD-00-3, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE.,
(1997), http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-00-3. The Secretary of the Treasury
chairs the working group, and other members include the chairs of CFTC, the
Federal Reserve System, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
87. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, SIMPSON THACHER & BAR-r-
io-r LLP, 1 (2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cyber/Treasury
%20-%20Banking%20and%20Finance%20Sector%20Profile%20and%20Goals.
pdf.
88. Lynch, supra note 38, at 1378.
89. Id. at 1378-79.
90. Id. at 1379.
91. Id. at 1380.
92. Id.
93. The derivatives markets were transformed from simple commodity exchanges to
multi-trillion dollar markets. Id. at 1382.
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they facilitated strong interconnectedness among the financial institutions
and in the following years a handful of financial institutions rose to be-
come major dealers who controlled the trading of derivatives. 94 These
financial institutions transacted heavily with each other trading OTC fi-
nancial derivatives to hedge the risks from their customer trades and also
to trade for their own account, and had strong interconnection as
counterparties to derivatives transactions.95
The financial crisis exposed the interconnectedness of these OTC de-
rivative counterparties and the potential such interconnection had for
causing serious damage to the financial system through a domino effect,
wherein the failure of a single counterparty could lead to the failure of all
counterparties. 96
B. TIE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
The near-collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, followed by the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and the bailout
of American International Group (AIG) on September 16, 2008, put de-
rivatives at the center of the crisis.97 While the leading proximate causes
of the financial crisis were the unsound practices of the U.S. mortgage
lending industry in the early 2000s and excessive foreclosures resulting
from the housing market bubble burst, OTC derivatives, particularly
credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO),
were blamed for exacerbating the condition of the financial markets. 98
CDOs are asset-backed debt securities derived from various underlying
assets, such as loans and bonds. 99 CDOs derived from mortgage bonds
are known as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) and their value
depends on the value of the mortgages, which, in turn, depends on how
many of them are being paid off.100 CDOs, in general, were extremely
popular as an investment product up to 2007 and their popularity
stemmed from the fact that they provided high yields and were structured
in a way that they could withstand adverse events.10' Credit Default
Swaps, on the other hand, are bilateral swap contracts that insure against
losses to financial institutions and corporate bondholders from credit
risks-that is, provide protection in case of default, bankruptcy, or credit
94. Id.
95. Darrell Duffie, How Should We Regulate Derivatives Mkts?, PEW FIN. REFORM
PiRojtcr, (2009), http://www.pewfr.orgladmin/project-reports/files/Pew Duffie_
DerivativesPaperFINAL-TF-Correction.pdf.
96. Id. at 5-6.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id.
99. Though CDOs are derived from mortgage bonds, their being considered as deriva-
tives or not is a matter of labeling. CDOs are not held under ISDA Master Swap
Agreement. They are insured by credit default swaps (CDS). CDOs "are regu-
lated under laws governing the issuance of debt securities." Id. at 5.
100. Id.




ratings downgrade resulting in inability of the borrower of the loan to
repay the loan.'02 They are similar to insurance contracts, in which the
seller of the protection promises the buyer of the protection a particular
amount in case of a default, in exchange for payment of a periodic pre-
mium fee. The value of CDSs swings with the fiscal health of the transac-
tion or asset it is written to cover.103 During the recent housing boom in
the United States, CDS sellers sold protection to CDO investors against
the default of mortgage-backed securities-as long as the housing prices
were appreciating and mortgage borrowing was escalating, the CDO and
CDS markets were also thriving. 104 When the housing bubble deflated in
2007, the residential property prices plunged and the subprime borrowers
began defaulting on their loans.105 The mortgage defaults reduced the
value of mortgage-backed securities and, as a result, holders of these se-
curities lost their payments and their investments.106 The CDO market
was hit hard by mortgage defaults.107 The situation in the market was
further aggravated by the fact that investors were too scared to touch
housing-based investments, crashing any hope to save the market by rais-
ing new capital. The CDS market, wherein CDSs were sold as protection
for CDOs backed by subprime mortgages, was in no better shape ei-
ther.108 The CDS insurers came under tremendous pressure to compen-
sate banks and other protected buyers for the loss of value in their CDO
portfolios from mortgage defaults. 109 But, they were not adequately capi-
talized to make good on their promises and the CDO and CDS markets
were completely destroyed, which, in turn, shook the foundation of prom-
inent Wall Street firms that were heavily invested in these markets.110
Bear Stearns, the nation's fifth largest investment banking firm, had
made significant investments in mortgage-backed securities and was
heavily exposed to the subprime mortgage market."' Like other Wall
Street firms, Bear was also actively engaged in packaging, underwriting,
trading, and investing in mortgage-backed securities. 112 It also operated
a significant prime brokerage business, in which it served as a
counterparty intermediary for a large volume of OTC derivatives transac-
tions.' 13 With the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, Bear
102. Duffie, supra note 95, at 5.
103. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 183, 200 (2009).
104. See generally Martin Neil Bailey et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, BROOK-
INGS: INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS AND PUB. Po.'y, (Nov. 2008), http://www.brook-







110. Duffie, supra note 95, at 5.
111. Okamoto, supra note 103, at 197.
112. Id.
113. Prime brokerage business of an investment bank focuses on the trading activities
of large professional traders like hedge funds. Id.
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Steams was forced to write-down losses in its trading portfolios com-
prised of mortgage-related securities.114 These portfolios were used as
collateral to support its access to borrowed funds.1 5 Bear's lenders
asked for more collateral and the firm was left with no other option other
than to sell its mortgage-related assets at sharply discounted prices to
meet the collateral calls.116 The fire sale of the assets led to a further
drop in their value, thus making the market nervous about Bear Stearns'
financial health and generally reluctant to lend funds to the firm through
the interbank market.117 Around the same time, Bear's prime brokerage
clients also withdrew their accounts from the firm, causing panic in the
already nervous market and leading derivatives counterparties to start
making margin calls for additional collateral to protect themselves from
potential losses in the event Bear Stearns fell into bankruptcy.118 Finally,
it all resulted in creating enormous pressure on the already shrinking li-
quidity of the firm, causing a liquidity crunch, and Bear suffered a run on
the bank. 119 In an effort to avert the firm's bankruptcy, stabilize the firm,
and prevent a wider financial panic, the Federal Reserve intervened and
Bear Stearns was sold off to J.P. Morgan on March 22, 2008.120
Lehman's story was not much different from that of Bear Stearns. Like
Bear, Lehman had also made significant investments in mortgage-backed
securities and was equally exposed to the subprime mortgage market. 121
Lehman was a major player in the securitization and credit derivatives
markets and it "actively sought to arbitrage the securitization and credit
derivatives markets by investing in securitizations and subsequently di-
vesting itself of the associated risk by means of CDS of CDO transac-
tions."122 The collapse of the housing market in 2007 significantly
impacted Lehman's multi-billion dollar portfolio of mortgage-related se-
curities, and as its losses intensified, Lehman's credit ratings began to sink
leading to demands for the firm to post additional collateral, which it was
unable to do, thus leading it to file for bankruptcy on September 15,




117. JAN JOB DE VRIEs RoBBm2, STRUCTURED FINANCE: ON FROM THE CREDIT
CRUNCII-TiF ROAD ro RECOVERY 21 (2009).
118. Okamoto, supra note 103, at 197.
119. Id.
120. Bear Stearns to Sell Itself to JPMorgan for $2 A Share, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 2008,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/bear-stearns-races-to-a-sale-to-jpmorgan/.
121. Okamoto, supra note 103, at 197-98.
122. See ROBBt, supra note 117, at 22. But, investigation has revealed that it was not
CDS that led to the firm's failure. Lehman's bankruptcy examiner's report states
that the firm failed because of the poor business decisions of its management. In
fact, Lehman's derivative trades, which accounted for only 3.3% of its net assets,
were more carefully monitored than other asset classes. See Anton R. Valukas, In
re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Examiner's Report 16-17 & 568-578, available at http://
lehmanreport.jenner.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
123. Sept. 15, 2008 (Monday): Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Stocks Plummet on Wall
St., SMART MONEY, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/investing/econ-
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financial institutions that had open trading positions with Lehman be-
came wary of lending to each other, fearing that open positions against
Lehman might implicate the creditworthiness of their counterparties,
leading to a credit freeze in the financial markets. 1 2 4
Only two days after Lehman declared bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve
bailed out the American International Group, Inc. (AIG), with an $85
billion revolving two-year credit facility from the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.125 Although AIG was an insurance company rather than
an investment bank, it was heavily exposed in the credit derivatives mar-
ket-it sold massive amount of CDSs through its Financial Products
Group, headquartered in London, without having the financial resources
necessary to cover potential payments.126 AIG "wrote about $1.8 trillion
worth of credit default swaps guaranteeing payment if certain mortgage-
backed securities defaulted or experienced other 'credit events."" 27 Of
this, $ 61.4 billion was written on CDOs with exposure to subprime mort-
gages.12 8 The collapse of the subprime housing market impacted the
value of the CDOs that the company wrote CDSs on and AIG was forced
to write-down massive losses in its CDS portfolio: $11.2 billion in 2007,
and $19.9 billion for the first nine months of 2008.129 Additionally, AIG's
credit-rating downgrade required the firm to post $14.5 billion in collat-
eral.130 Although AIG had assets to take care of the additional collateral
requirement, there was not enough time for it to satisfy those demands
promptly.' 3 ' There was a danger that the insurance giant would collapse,
and with it, potentially all the banks that had purchased protection from
it. Because OTC contracts are customized contracts with limited trans-
parency in their markets, it was unclear which banks were exposed to
AIG's insolvency, and to what degree. 3 2 This uncertainty caused the
credit markets to freeze at the peak of the crisis, thereby forcing the gov-
ernment to step in to control the situation and bring stability to the mar-
kets-primarily though bailouts, of which AIG received a substantial
amount to pay its counterparties.' 33
omy/september-15-2008-monday-lehman-files-for-bankruptcy-stocks-plummet-on-
wall-street/.
124. See Ro3a311, supra note 117, at 22.
125. See generally Justin Fox, Why the Government Wouldn't Let AIG Fail, TIMiE, Sept.
16, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1841699,00.html; Mat-
thew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WAu ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, http://on-
line.wsj.com/article/SB122165238916347677.htmi.
126. Okamoto, supra note 103, at 200.
127. MIULER, supra note 65, at 4.
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The set-back to the economy because of these incidents generated in-
creased concern about the state of the OTC markets. It was strongly felt
that limited transparency of these markets and transactions therein let
them grow to such enormity unchecked, which ultimately resulted in
causing serious damage to the U.S. financial system.134 Additionally, the
interconnectedness of the financial institutions only aggravated the mat-
ter further as the risk of CDS and other OTC derivatives remained con-
centrated among a handful of such institutions. The old debates
concerning the regulation of OTC derivatives took the forefront and with
great vigor this time around. Finally, after two years of contentious legis-
lative process, the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21,
2010.135
IV. KEY PROVISIONS OF TITLE VII OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, the "Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act," essentially alters the trading of swaps and other
OTC derivatives in the United States with its repeal of the exemptions
that OTC derivatives enjoyed under the provisions of the CFMA and by
subjecting the OTC derivatives market to an extensive regulatory frame-
work. 1 3 6 Unless otherwise provided, the provisions of Title VII become
effective on the later of (1) July 16, 2011, which is 360 days from the
enactment date of the Dodd-Frank Act, and (2) in case of provisions of
the Act that require a rulemaking, sixty days after the publication of such
rule or regulation implementing that provision.137 Under the new re-
gime, derivatives market, its participants, and trading activity will be sub-
ject to comprehensive regulation and supervision. 138 The Act provides
the CFTC and SEC with the authority to regulate swaps, their dealers,
and markets while maintaining the jurisdictional separation between the
two agencies reached under the Shad-Johnson Accord.13 9 Whereas the
CFTC will have substantial regulatory authority over swaps, swap deal-
ers, and major swap participants, the SEC will have the same authority
over security-based swaps, security-based swap dealers, and major secur-
ity-based swap participants. 14 0 It is noteworthy though that according to
recent estimates, the majority of outstanding OTC derivatives will fall
134. Duffie, supra note 95, at 11.
135. Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Enacted Into Law on July 21, 2010, supra note 1, at i.
136. The Wall St. Transparency & Accountability Act: Implications for Derivatives Mar-
ket Participants, CLIENT MEMORANDUM (Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP), 1 (JuL.y
23, 2010), http://www.wilikie.com/files/tbl s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686
%5C3437%5CThe-Wall-Street-Act.pdf.
137. Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Enacted Into Law on July 21, 2010, supra note 1, at 61.
138. The Wall St. Transparency & Accountability Act: Implications for Derivatives Mar-
ket Participants, supra note 136, at 1.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1-2
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under the jurisdiction of the CFTC.141 The CFTC, once described as a
"sleepy little agency" by its then-chairwoman Mary Schapiro, post-Dodd-
Frank Act, is the top cop for the U.S. derivatives market.14 2 The Act
further requires the aforementioned two agencies to issue in joint rules
with respect to a small number of definitions for the implementation of
the legislation. 1 4 3 In doing so, they are required to consult with each
other and with federal banking regulators of banking institutions engaged
in swap activities. 1 44 Hence, it is critical that the regulators cooperate
with each other for the successful completion of the extensive
rulemakings.
The objective of the new legislation is to bring about transparency and
efficiency in the market, promote competition, reduce the potential for
counterparty and systemic risk, and also tackle the issue of interconnec-
tion in the financial markets. This objective will be achieved by having a
regulatory system that requires: (1) all swaps, subject to limited excep-
tions, be centrally cleared and traded on exchanges or comparable trad-
ing facilities; (2) swap dealers and major market participants be subjected
to capital and margin requirements, and heightened business conduct re-
quirements; and (3) public reporting of transaction and pricing data on
both cleared and un-cleared swaps.14 5 In this article, the focus is to dis-
cuss the key provisions of Title VII and analyze their impact on dealers
and end users of swaps.
A. REGULATION OF MARKETS AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS
1. Registration of Swap dealers and Major Swap Participants
The Act requires swap dealers, including security-based swap dealers,
and major swap participants, including major security-based swap partici-
pants, to register with the CFTC or SEC, depending on if their business
involves swaps or security-based swaps, not later than one year after the
enactment date, i.e. July 16, 2011.146 Upon registration, these swap deal-
ers and MSPs will be subject to additional scrutiny and regulation-they
will submit reports of their trading activity, terms and conditions of their
swaps, and their financial integrity protection to the CFTC or SEC, as
applicable. 14 7 An entity can be designated a swap dealer (or security-
based swap dealer) or a major swap participant (or major security-based
141. Marc Howitz et al., Dodd-Frank Act Aims to Fundamentally Change Trading of
OTC Derivatives, DLA PIPER, Jul. 26, 2010, http://www.dlapiper.com/dodd-frank-
act-aims-to-fundamentally-change-trading-of-otc-derivatives/.
142. CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has requested Congress to increase his agency's
budget by sixty-nine percent next year to $286 million. Asjylyn Loder & Matthew
Leising, Republican Victory Won't Stop New Rules, Gensler Says, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.businessweek.cominews/2010-11-03re-
publican-victory-won-t-stop-new-rules-gensler-says.html.
143. Dodd-Frank Act § 712(d).
144. Id.
145. See generally Dodd-Frank Act.
146. Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(b)(5)).
147. § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(j)).
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swap participant) for a single type, class, or category of swap (security-
based swap) or for multiple classes of swaps.148 The Act grants authority
to the Commissions to determine the form and manner of the registration
process for swap dealers and major swap participants.14 9 The terms
"swap dealer" 50 and "security-based swap dealer"15 are similarly de-
fined and refer to a dealer in swaps or security-based swaps respectively.
The only difference between the two definitions is substitution of "secur-
ity-based swap" in place of "swap." In this article, the term "swap
dealer" is used to refer to both. A swap dealer is defined as any person
who:
(i) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in swaps;
(iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary
course of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in any activity
causing the person to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or
market maker in swaps. 152
Under this definition banks, dealers, and other financial institutions
that are active in derivatives markets will be considered "swap dealers"
unless (a) an insured depository institution "offers to enter into a swap
with a customer in connection with originating a loan with that cus-
tomer;"153 (b) an entity buys or sells swaps "for such person's own ac-
count, either individually or in a fiduciary capacity,"154 and not as "part
of a regular business;" 155 and (c) "an entity that engages in a 'de minimis
quantity' 56 of swap dealing in connection with transactions with or on
behalf of its customers." 57 Like swap dealers, major swap participants
will also be subjected to extensive supervision and scrutiny.' 58 The terms
"Major Swap Participant"15 9 and "Major Security-Based Swap Partici-
pant" 160 are also similarly defined and refer to a participant in swaps or
security-based swaps respectively. Again, the difference between the two
terms is substitution of "security-based swap" in place of "swap." For the
purpose of this article, the term "MSP" will be used to refer to both. A
MSP is any entity that is not a swap dealer and that fulfills any one of the
following criteria:
It "maintains a 'substantial position' in swaps for any of the major
swap categories as determined by" the CFTC or SEC, excluding "po-
148. § 721(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la), 761(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
149. § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(b)).
150. § 721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. Ia).
151. § 761 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
152. § 721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(49)(A)).
153. Id. No such exception for depository institutions from the definition of "security-
based swap dealer." § 761 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
154. § 721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(49)(C)).
155. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(49)(C)) (referencing end users).
156. What constitutes "de minimis quantity," will be determined through the CFTC and
SEC rulemaking process.
157. Dodd-Frank Act §721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(49)(C)).
158. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(33))
159. Id.
160. § 761 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)).
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sitions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk" and positions
held by employee benefit plans for hedging or mitigating its risks;161
Its "outstanding swaps create 'substantial counterparty exposure'
that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of
the United States banking system or financial market"1 62; or
It "is a financial entity that is highly leveraged relative to the amount
of capital it holds and that is not subject to capital requirements es-
tablished by an appropriate Federal banking agency," and it "main-
tains a substantial position in outstanding swap" transactions in
CFTC or SEC determined major swap categories. 163
The definition of MSP excludes from its purview finance subsidiaries,
i.e. entities "whose primary business is providing financing, and uses de-
rivatives for the purpose of hedging underlying commercial risks related
to interest rate and foreign currency exposures."' 64 These finance subsid-
iaries facilitate the purchase or lease of products which are manufactured
by the parent company or another subsidiary of the parent company. It is
worth noting that the definition of MSP is critical for the end user exemp-
tion extended to the corporate users of derivatives under the provisions
of the Act. If an entity does not fall within the criteria specified for a
MSP and is not a swap dealer, it can avail the benefits of the end users
exemption-in which case the entity will not be subject to clearing re-
quirements as long as the entity engages in OTC derivatives to hedge
commercial risk of its business.1 6 5
2. Capital and Margin Requirements
Swap dealers and major swap participants, pursuant to registration, will
be required to satisfy minimum capital requirements, and with respect to
uncleared swaps, margin requirements (initial and variation).166 The cap-
ital and margin requirements will be determined by the CFTC or SEC for
nonbank swap dealers and nonbank major swap participants.16 7 For
banks that are swap dealers, the appropriate federal banking regulator, in
consultation with the Commissions, will establish these requirements, not
later than one year after the enactment date.'68 With respect to cleared
swaps, the requirements of DCO or the clearing agency, as applicable,
will apply.169 In determining the capital and margin requirements for un-
cleared swaps, the regulatory bodies must take into account the risks as-
161. § 721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(33)(A)(i)). Under the requirements of the
Act, the CFTC or SEC will define the term "substantial position," which shall be
at a level prudent for monitoring of such entities that are systemically important.
Id.
162. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(33)(A)(ii)). The term "substantial counterparty
exposure" will be addressed in the rulemaking process by the CFTC and SEC.
163. Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. I a(33)(A)(iii)).
164. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la(33)(D)).
165. Id.
166. § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(e)), 764 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78a).
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sociated with all swaps and other activities of the swap dealer or MSP,
and not just the risks related to the types, classes, or categories of swaps
that made such entity eligible to qualify as a swap dealer or MSP.o70 The
prudential regulator and the Commissions also have the authority to al-
low the use of noncash collateral to meet margin requirements as long as
it is consistent with the financial integrity of the swap markets and pre-
serving the integrity of the U.S. financial system.' 7 ' At this point, it will
not be unreasonable to assume that the capital and margin requirements
for uncleared swaps will be significantly higher than the requirements im-
posed in connection with cleared swaps. The intent of the legislation is to
"offset the greater risk to the swap dealer or major swap participant and
the financial system arising from the use of swaps that are not cleared,"
and that the requirements shall "(i) help ensure the safety and soundness
of the swap dealer or major swap participant; and (ii) be appropriate for
the risk associated with the non-cleared swaps held as a swap dealer or
major swap participant."1 7 2 It is worth highlighting that the higher capital
and margin requirements for uncleared swaps will translate into higher
cost of transaction for counterparties. The increased costs along with low
liquidity for uncleared swaps might deter business entities from entering
into customized bilateral transactions. Further, despite Congress's inten-
tion to exclude end users from the margin requirement, there is no ex-
press exemption for end users under the Act similar to the exemption
from the clearing requirement for such end users. Unless there is clarity
on the issue of exemption from margin for existing swaps or end user
swaps, the situation will remain unclear.173
3. Recordkeeping and Business Conduct Requirements
The Act mandates that swap dealers and major swap participants pro-
vide reports to the CFTC or SEC, as applicable, regarding the transac-
tions they enter into, the positions they take, and their overall financial
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also § 764 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78a).
173. There is no provision in the Act authorizing regulators to retroactively impose
margin and capital requirements to existing swaps. But, while addressing
mandatory central clearing of swaps, the Act provides that a financing affiliate,
subsidiary or a wholly-owned entity of a person that qualifies for the non-financial
entity exemption to the mandatory clearing requirement, will be exempt from mar-
gin requirements for the first two years after the date of enactment of the Act.
Senators Dodd and Lincoln wrote a letter, dated June 30, 2010, to Representatives
Frank and Peterson to offer clarification on this issue. The letter states in clear
terms that the legislation "does not authorize the regulators to impose margin on
end users." Further, the letter also states that the Congressional intent is to pro-
vide certainty to existing contracts and avoid any disruptions to them "for the sake
of the economy and the financial system." Letter from Chairman Christopher
Dodd, Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs and Chairman Blanche
Lincoln, Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, to Chairman Barney
Frank, House Fin. Services Comm. and Chairman Colin Peterson, House Comm.
on Agric. (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.schiffhardin.com/PDFs/dodd-lin-
coln-letter070110.pdf [hereinafter Dodd-Lincoln Letter].
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condition. 174 Under the provisions of the Act, swap dealers and major
swap participants will maintain daily trading records along with "re-
corded communications," including e-mails, instant messages, and re-
corded telephone calls per the requirements of the Commissions.17 5 They
will also be required to maintain books and records of all their swap ac-
tivities in the form and manner that the Commissions prescribe.' 7 6 Swap
dealers will further be required to "maintain a complete audit trail for
conducting comprehensive and accurate trade reconstructions."' 7 7
Under the new regime, swap dealers and major swap participants will
be subjected to "business conduct" rules adopted by the Commissions.178
The Commissions will establish duties for swap dealers and major swap
participants to verify their counterparties' status as eligible contract par-
ticipants, to disclose material risks and characteristics of transactions, to
disclose any "material incentives or conflicts of interest" they may have
with respect to a transaction, and to communicate with their counterpar-
ties "in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and
good faith."17 9 Furthermore, the Commissions have broad authority to
enact additional rules relating to fraud prevention and to curtail other
manipulative and abusive practices that have the potential to impact
adversely.180
4. Duties with Respect to Special Entities
Swap dealers and major swap participants will be required to take extra
care when dealing with "special entities," which include: a Federal
agency; a State, State agency, city, county, municipality, or other political
subdivision of a State; an employee benefit plan; any governmental plan;
or an endowment.' 8 As an advisor to such a special entity, swap dealers
and MSPs are prohibited from employing any device or scheme to de-
fraud a special entity or engaging in any transaction or course of business
that is basically fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative, or operates as a
fraud or deceit on any special entity.18 2 A swap dealer or MSP also has
"a duty to act in the best interests of the Special Entity"'83 and make
reasonable efforts to obtain information that is helpful in determining
that a recommended swap is in the best interest of the special entity.184
As a counterparty to a special entity in a swap transaction, a swap
dealer or a major participant must have a reasonable basis to believe that
the special entity has an independent representative that (i) will act in the
174. Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(f)(1)(A)).
175. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(g)(1)).
176. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(f)(1)(B)).
177. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(g)(4)).
178. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(1)).
179. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(3)(A)-(C)).
180. § 763(g) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78i(j)).
181. § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(2)).
182. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(4)(A)).
183. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(4)(B)).
184. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(4)(C)).
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best interest of the entity; (ii) has no connection with the swap dealer or
major swap participant; (iii) is knowledgeable to evaluate the risks in-
volved in the transaction and provide written representations to the spe-
cial entity regarding fair pricing and the appropriateness of the
transaction; and (iv) in the case of employee benefit plans, is a fiduci-
ary.185 Before entering into a swap transaction with a special entity, a
swap dealer or a MSP must also provide written disclosure to the special
entity of the capacity in which they are acting.186 It is important to note
that these heightened requirements do not apply to transactions initiated
by a special entity and executed on an exchange or swap execution facil-
ity where the identity of a counterparty is not known.187
B. CENTRAL CLEARING, TRADING, AND REPORTING
1. Central Clearing
OTC derivatives contracts are privately negotiated bilateral contracts.
Because these contracts are not traded on organized exchanges with cen-
tral clearinghouses, the credit risk in these contracts is borne by the indi-
vidual counterparties.s88 To eliminate the credit risk, the Act mandates
central clearing for derivatives that can be cleared.189 The use of central
counterparties (CCPs) in OTC derivatives markets will help mitigate
counterparty risk-the risk associated with the failure of a party to fulfill
its obligations to the other in a bilateral transaction.190 A CCP is an inde-
pendent legal entity that interposes itself between the buyer and the
seller of a derivative security.191 The presence of this third party in the
bilateral OTC derivatives contracts "ensure[s] that every buyer has a
guaranteed seller and every seller has a guaranteed buyer, thus minimiz-
ing the risk that one counterparty's default will cause a systemic ripple
through the markets."' 92
The Act requires that all swaps be subject to mandatory clearing pro-
vided the CFTC or the SEC has determined that they be cleared and they
are acceptable for clearing to a "derivatives clearing organization"
(DCO) (in the case of a swap) or a clearing agency (in the case of a
security-based swap).193 A DCO or clearing agency must submit to the
CFTC or SEC, as applicable, for their approval any group, category, type,
or class of swaps that it intends to clear, and provide notice of the submis-
185. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(5)(A)(i)(I), (III)-(IV), (VII)).
186. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(h)(5)(A)(ii)).
187. Id.
188. See Stephen G. Cecchetti et al., Central Counterparties for Over-the-Counter De-
rivatives, BIS Q. Riiv,, Sept. 2009, at 45, 47.
189. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2 (h)).
190. See Cecchetti et al., supra note 188, at 45.
191. Id.
192. Review of Credit Derivatives Before the Subcomm. On General Farm Commodities
and Risk Management of the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. (2008) (state-
ment of Walter Lukken).
193. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(1)(A)).
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sion to its members. 194 It is the responsibility of the CFTC or SEC, as
applicable, to make the submissions available to the public, make its de-
termination as to whether clearing is required for the derivative, and pro-
vide at least a thirty day public comment period regarding its
determination. 9 5 The CFTC or SEC has ninety days from the day of
receipt of submission to make a determination.' 9 6 In addition to the sub-
missions made by clearing organizations, the CFTC or SEC may itself
initiate review of any group, category, type or class of swap to determine
whether mandatory clearing should apply.'197 In determining which swaps
need to be cleared, the regulators should consider the following factors:
(i) existence of notional exposures, trading liquidity and pricing data; (ii)
the availability of operational expertise and relevant infrastructure for
clearing; (iii) the effect on mitigation of systemic risk and on competition;
and (iv) the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the treatment of
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds and property in the
event of insolvency of the clearinghouse.' 98
Clearinghouses do not have their own funds to deal with the defaults of
their participants and absorb losses resulting from them.199 Instead, they
depend on a system of margin or collateral.200 Traders are required to
deposit an initial margin payment with the clearinghouse before the trade
194. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(B)(i)). The Act requires clearing organiza-
tions to register with the CFTC in order to clear swaps and with the SEC in order
to clear security-based swaps. To be able to register or maintain its registration
with the applicable agency, a DCO must meet an extensive set of criteria, with the
most important criteria being: (1) each DCO must have adequate financial, opera-
tional and managerial resources, as determined by the CFTC or SEC, respectively;
(2) each DCO must possess financial resources that, at a minimum, exceed the
total amount that would (a) enable the DCO to meet its financial obligations to its
members and participants, notwithstanding a default by the member or participant
creating the largest financial exposure for the DCO in "extreme but plausible mar-
ket conditions;" and (b) enable the DCO to cover the costs of the DCO for a one-
year period; (3) each DCO must establish and implement procedures to verify the
compliance of each participation and membership requirement of the DCO on an
ongoing basis; (4) each DCO must (a) not less than once during each business day,
measure the credit exposures of the DCO to each member and participant of the
DCO, and (b) monitor each such exposure periodically during the business day of
the DCO; (5) each DCO, through margin requirements and other risk control
measures, must limit its exposure to potential losses from default by its members
and participants; (6) each DCO must have rules and procedures designed to allow
for the efficient, fair, and safe management of events in the event of a member or
participant's insolvency or default on their obligations to the DCO. Id. § 725 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. 7a-1(c)(2)).
195. § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)). The Commissions are required to
establish, within one year of enactment, rules for the submission and review of
derivatives accepted by clearinghouses for clearing. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.
2(h)(2)(E)).
196. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(C)). The ninety-day review period may be
extended up to ninety days or longer by the reviewing agency on application of
counterparty or on its own initiative. Id.
197. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(A)(i)).
198. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(D)).
199. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 2.
200. See id.
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to cover any future potential losses.201 "Then at the end of each trading
day, all contracts are repriced, or "marked to market," and all those who
have lost money (because prices moved against them) must respond to
the margin call and post additional margin (called variation or mainte-
nance margin) to cover those losses before the next trading session." 202
Under the provisions of the Act, swap counterparties of cleared transac-
tions that are not cleared by a registered DCO will be required to post
initial and variation margins. 203 Posting margins would result into re-
duced liquidity and potential increased costs for the counterparties-ac-
cording to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) report, upfront costs
to dealers from posting of the initial margin and contributions to CCPs'
guarantee fund would be up to $150 billion.204 Further, dealers will not
be able to re-use (by lending, pledging, investing, or rehypothecating) the
funds and securities posted as collateral at the CCP and will suffer a loss
on the potential interest income. 2 0 5 Though margins are not required
from end users, there is a possibility that end users might get impacted
indirectly from increased costs resulting from posting of margins if those
costs are passed through to them from the dealers.206 The increased costs
of transactions might deter counterparties from entering into derivatives
transactions, but the good news is that the industry recognizes the value
of clearinghouses as a means of reducing risk and has already cleared
over $200 trillion of interest rate swaps despite these costs. 2 0 7 As clear-
inghouses further develop their ability to clear a variety of products with
more firms and make OTC derivatives markets safe for trading, they will
be able to attract more dealers to clear their trades through them, even
with all costs attached as the benefits of clearing outweigh these costs.
Additionally, the changed scenario will see market participants as
members of several DCOs or clearing agencies. It is not clear, though, if
their membership of multiple DCOs and/or clearing agencies would allow
them to enjoy the advantages of netting and margin posted, not just
across products, but also across clearing platforms. 208 While there is no
express prohibition on clearing organizations to provide such a benefit to
the members, under the provisions of the Act, the clearing organizations
cannot be compelled to accept the counterparty credit risk of another
clearing organization if there is risk to its financial integrity.209
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Dodd-Frank Act § 731(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 4s(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
204. INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABurry REPORT: MEETING NEw
CHALLENGES To STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEm 101 (2010), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf.
205. Id.
206. As noted above, the issue of exemption from margin for end users requires clarifi-
cation as the Act does not expressly exempt end users from such requirement.
207. Letter from Conrad Voldstad, CEO, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, to Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.isda.org/speeches/
pdflIMF-Letter-Revised.pdf.
208. See Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78a).
209. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(4)(C)).
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Commercial End User Exemption to Clearing: Corporations use deriv-
atives for hedging or mitigating business risks, but under the new law
such end users of derivatives have been exempted from the mandatory
clearing requirement. 210 Consequently, end users will also enjoy exemp-
tion from exchange trading and possibly margin requirements. Under the
provisions of the Act, there is an optional exemption from the clearing
requirement to a swap counterparty that (i) is not a "financial entity," (ii)
is using the swap to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and (iii) notifies
the CFTC or SEC, as applicable, how it generally meets its financial obli-
gations associated with entering into uncleared swaps.211 An exempted
counterparty has the option to clear swap contracts with a clearinghouse
if such counterparty chooses to do so; the counterparty also can choose
the clearinghouse it wishes to use for the purpose.212 For the purposes of
this exemption, it is important to understand what the term "financial
entity" stands for because the exemption has been granted to counterpar-
ties that are not "financial entities." The Act defines a "financial entity"
as a swap dealer or a major swap participant as defined in the Act, a
commodity pool as defined in the CEA, a private fund as defined in sec-
tion 202(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, an employee benefit
plan as defined under ERISA, or a person predominantly engaged in ac-
tivities that are in the business of banking, or in activities that are finan-
cial in nature. 2 1 3 This exemption is strictly for corporate end users
engaged in hedging transactions and will not be extended to entities like
hedge funds, irrespective of their status as major swap participants or
not.2 14 But the definition expressly excludes certain captive finance com-
panies whose primary business is providing financing, and which use de-
rivatives for the purpose of hedging underlying commercial risks related
to interest rate and foreign currency exposures, ninety percent or more of
which arise from financing that facilitates the purchase or lease of prod-
ucts, ninety percent or more of which are manufactured by the parent
company or another subsidiary of the parent company. 215 In plain lan-
guage, captive finance companies, i.e. those affiliate companies that are
wholly owned by a parent company and whose primary business is to
provide financing for customers purchasing or leasing the parent com-
pany's products - will be exempt from clearing requirements for swaps
entered to mitigate risk related to interest rate and foreign exposures.
Further, the Act leaves it to the discretion of the CFTC and SEC to ex-
empt small banks, savings associations, farm credit system institutions,
and credit unions with total assets not exceeding $10 billion from the defi-
nition of a "financial entity". 2 1 6 Whether these institutions will be ex-
210. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7)(A)).
211. Id.
212. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7)(B)).
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cluded or not from the definition will become clear only after the
completion of the rulemaking process of the Commissions.
Effect on Existing Trades: Swaps entered into before the date of the
enactment of the Act are exempt from the clearing requirements as long
as they are reported to a swap data repository or to the Commissions no
later than 180 days of such date.217 Additionally, swaps entered into
before the clearing mandate is effective are exempt if reported to a swap
repository or the Commissions within ninety days after the Effective date
or at such other time as the applicable Commission may prescribe.218
2. Trading
OTC derivatives are not exchange-traded, however, to improve trans-
parency, promote efficiency, and reduce systemic risk in the OTC deriva-
tives market, the Act requires all cleared swaps to be traded on a
designated contract market, 219 or a registered swap execution facility (in
the case of a swap), or a national securities exchange, or a security-based
swap execution facility (in the case of a security-based swap). 220 A "swap
execution facility" is a facility "in which multiple participants have the
ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers" made by
other participants in the facility, through any means of interstate com-
merce. 221 The trading requirement of the Act will not apply in the case of
uncleared swaps of counterparties opting to exercise the commercial end
user exemption for clearing.2 2 2 Exchange trading will bring price trans-
parency to OTC derivatives trading, as the prices of the trades will be
published, and will become easily accessible to the public. 2 2 3 Exchanges
have improved the functioning of the existing securities and futures mar-
kets by producing better price information and a more liquid market,
and, hopefully, will be able to do the same for OTC markets. 224
3. Reporting and Publication of Transaction Data
In order to improve market transparency and provide regulators tools
for monitoring derivatives trading activity, the new regulatory regime re-
quires collection and publication of data through clearinghouses or swap
repositories.225 Swaps not accepted for clearing by a clearing organiza-
217. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(5)).
218. Id.
219. A swap contract with a party that is not an "eligible contract participant" must be
entered into on a designated contract market. An "eligible contract participant"
includes, subject to limitations, financial institutions, insurance companies, invest-
ment companies, commodity pools, employee benefit plans, government entities,
brokers, dealers, high net worth individuals, and others. 7 U.S.C. § la (2011).
220. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8)(A)).
221. § 721(a)(21) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. Ia).
222. § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7)(A)).
223. Chairman Gary Gensler, Remarks Before SIFMA Post-Financial Reform Confer-
ence (Jul. 15, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/
opagensler-49.html.
224. Id.
225. Dodd-Frank Act § 727 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(13)).
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tion must be reported to a registered swap repository or a "registered
securities-based swap repository," as applicable.226 In case a swap reposi-
tory does not accept the report or there is no swap repository to report to,
the data should be reported to the CFTC or SEC.2 2 7 The Act defines a
"swap data repository" as "any person that collects and maintains infor-
mation or records with respect to transactions or positions in, or the
terms and conditions of, swaps entered into by third parties for the pur-
pose of providing a centralized recordkeeping facility for swaps."228
Swap data repositories are required to register with the CFTC or SEC.2 2 9
They are also required to make available on a confidential basis all data
obtained by such repositories to (a) each appropriate prudential regula-
tor; (b) the Financial Stability Oversight Council; (c) the SEC; (d) the
Department of Justice; and (e) any other person that the CFTC or SEC
determines to be appropriate, including foreign financial supervisors, cen-
tral banks, and ministries.230 The swap data repositories shall also "estab-
lish and maintain emergency procedures, backup facilities, and a plan for
disaster recovery that allows for the timely recovery and resumption of
operations and the fulfillment of the responsibilities and obligations of
the organization." 2 3 1
The responsibility for reporting uncleared swaps, for the most part, lies
with swap intermediaries and not end users.232 For example, if one of the
parties to the contract is a swap dealer or a major swap participant, the
responsibility lies with the swap participant or major swap participant.233
In a contract between a swap dealer and a major swap participant, the
swap dealer has the responsibility to report.234 But, where neither party
is a swap dealer or a major swap participant, or where both parties are
either swap dealers or major swap participants, then it is the responsibil-
ity of the counterparties to decide which party will report.235 The Act
leaves it to the discretion of the CFTC or SEC to promulgate rules con-
cerning the timing and content of the reports. 236 Further, the Act man-
dates that the CFTC or SEC promulgate rules and regulation for the
"real-time public reporting" of swap transaction and pricing data to en-
hance price discovery.237 "Real time public reporting" is defined as pub-
lic dissemination of data, including price and volume, "as soon as
technologically practicable after the time at which swap transaction has
been executed." 238 Real-time public reporting will apply to all swaps that
226. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(13)(C)).
227. § 729 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 6o-1(4r)(a)(1)(B)).
228. § 721(a)(21) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. la).
229. § 728 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 24(21)(g)).
230. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 24(21)(c)(7)).
231. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 24(21)(c)(8)).




236. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 6o-1(4r)(a)(1)(B)).
237. § 727 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(13)(E)).
238. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(13)(A)).
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are subject to the mandatory clearing requirement, including those that
are exempt from the clearing requirement pursuant to end users exemp-
tion, and swaps that are not subject to mandatory clearing, but are ac-
cepted by a registered DCO or clearing agency.239 For transactions that
are not cleared but are reported to a swap data repository or the Com-
missions, as applicable, the Act requires the CFTC or SEC to promulgate
rules that ensure the details of the business transactions or market posi-
tions of any person are not disclosed and the parties are not identified.240
The concern that real-time price reporting of trades will come in the way
of execution of block trades has been addressed under the Act and the
Commissions have been authorized to specify criteria for determining
what constitutes a block trade for particular markets in order to institute
appropriate time delays of the reporting of such transactions. 241 In
promulgating these rules and regulations, the CFTC or SEC is required
to take into account whether public disclosure would materially reduce
market liquidity.2 4 2 Finally, the CFTC or SEC will issue semiannual or
annual reports on the trading and clearing of major swap categories and
the market participants and development of new products. 2 4 3
C. THE SWAPS PUSH-Ou-r RULE 2 4 4
The controversial "push-out" provision, originally proposed by Senator
Blanche Lincoln to the Senate Agriculture Committee, was modified and
a substantially moderated version of the provision is included in the
Act.2 4 5 Under § 716 of the Act, commonly known as "swaps push-out
rule", no federal assistance will be provided to registered swap dealers
and major swap participants "with respect to any swap, security-based
swap, or other activity of the swaps entity." 246 The Act defines "Federal
assistance" as:
the use of any advances from any Federal Reserve credit facility or
discount window that is not part of a program or facility with broad-
based eligibility under section 13(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance or guarantees for
the purpose of:
(A) Making any loan to, or purchasing any stock, equity interest,
or debt obligation of, any swaps entity;
239. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(13)(C)).
240. Id. (to be codified at I U.S.C. 2(a)(13)(E)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(14)(A)).
244. § 716.
245. See generally Matthew Leising, New Democrats Seek Swaps Trading Change, Op-
pose Lincoln Plan, BI ooMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jun. 16, 2010, http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/news/2010-06-16/new-democrats-seek-swaps-trading-change-
oppose-lincoln-plan.html; Phil Mattingly, House Democrats Target Senator Lin-
coln's Swaps-Desk Proposal, BL00MBERc BUSINESSWEEK, May 25, 2010, http://
www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-25/house-democrats-target-senator-lincoln-s-
swaps-desk-proposal.html.
246. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(a).
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(B) Purchasing the assets of any swaps entity;
(C) Guaranteeing any loan or debt issuance of any swaps entity;
or entering into any assistance arrangement (including tax
breaks), loss sharing, or profit sharing with any swaps entity;
or
(D) Entering into any assistance arrangement (including tax
breaks), loss sharing, or profit sharing with any swaps
entity.247
Furthermore, a "swap entity" for the purposes of federal assistance
prohibition includes any swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, major
swap participant or major-security-based swap participant registered with
the CFTC or SEC, except insured depository institutions that are major
swap participants. 2 4 8 An insured depository institution acting as swap
dealers, though, will be considered a "swap entity" under the provisions
of the Act. These insured depository institutions acting as swap dealers
are exempted from the prohibition on federal assistance under the Push-
Out Rule, as long as they engage in the following expressly permitted
swap activities:
(1) Hedging and other similar risk mitigating activities directly re-
lated to the insured depository institution's activities;
(2) Acting as a swaps entity for swaps or security-based swaps in-
volving rates or reference assets that are permissible for invest-
ment by a national bank under the paragraph designated as
"Seventh" of section 5136 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States ( 12 U.S.C. 24), other than as described in paragraph
(3)249
and acting as a swaps entity for credit default swaps that are cleared by a
derivatives clearing organization or a clearing agency.250
Hence, these depository institutions would be required to limit their
swap activities to only those that are specifically permitted under the Act
and push out all other kinds of swaps that are based on reference assets,
not permissible for investment by national banks, such as most commodi-
ties and equity securities, as well as uncleared CDS, unless they enter into
these transactions for hedging purposes. In simple words, banks or other
entities that have access to Federal Reserve credit or FDIC assistance,
and that currently deal with swaps and wish to continue their business as
247. § 716(b)(1).
248. § 716(b)(2)(A).
249. While national banks can invest in a wide array of assets, including loans, notes,
other extensions of credit, foreign currency, gold and other precious metals, U.S.
government and agency securities, investment grade commercial or residential
mortgage-related securities, marketable investment-grade asset-backed securities,
and other similar obligations, they are expressly prohibited to deal in equity securi-
ties. § 716(l).
250. Id. There is a possibility that these permitted activities may be banned in the fu-
ture if the Financial Stability Oversight Council, established under the Dodd-Frank
Act, makes such determination. Such determinations will be institution-specific
and will require affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members, including the
chairperson. § 121.
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swap dealers or as major swap participants would lose their eligibility for
federal assistance unless they spin off their swap businesses which deal
with activities outside of permitted swap activities under the Act, to an-
other entity, or divest or cease to engage in that business. An insured
depository institution may establish or maintain an affiliate that is a
swaps entity (registered dealer or MSP) provided the following condi-
tions are satisfied: (1) the insured depository institution is part of a bank
holding company that is supervised by the Federal Reserve, and (2) such
swaps entity affiliate satisfy the requirements of Sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act that govern transactions with the affiliated bank
and any other requirements as prescribed by the Federal Reserve, the
CFTC or SEC.251
The Swaps Push-Out Rule will be effective two years following the ef-
fective date of the Act, which will be approximately three years after en-
actment of the Act.2 5 2 If the insured depository institution which
qualifies as a "swaps entity" is interested in retaining its eligibility for
Federal assistance, then the appropriate Federal bank regulatory agency
will allow them an additional twenty-four month transition period, plus a
year's extension. 253 The one-year extension is discretionary and would be
allowed by the Federal bank regulatory agency only after consultation
with the CFTC and the SEC.2 5 4 During the transition period, such in-
sured depository institutions will be required to cease the activities that
require registration as a swaps entity by allowing them to push out their
swap business into an affiliate of the bank holding company or to another
entity.255 Any swaps entered into by these institutions before the expira-
tion of the transition period will remain unaffected by the prohibitions of
§ 716.256
The discussion on the "Swap Push-Out" provision cannot be complete
without the mention of the restrictions imposed by new Section 13 of the
Bank Holding Company Act, which is commonly referred to as the
"Volcker Rule," 2 57 first proposed by Paul Volcker, former chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the current
head of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board.258 Al-
though the Volcker Rule is included under Title VI of the Dodd-Frank
Act, its mention here is important because the Lincoln Provision man-
dates insured depository institution's compliance with the limitations on







257. § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(13)).
258. Chairman Paul A. Volcker, WiirFE HousE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administra-
tion/eop/perab/members/volcker (last visted Feb. 9, 2011).
259. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a new Section 13 has been added to the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 and provides that a banking entity shall not engage in pro-
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its insured banks and other "banking entities" from making speculative
bets for their own account, known as proprietary trading, subject to lim-
ited exceptions. 260 Proprietary trading has been defined as engaging as a
principal for the "trading account" of a banking entity in any transaction
to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, (1) any security,
derivative, or contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, (2) any
option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or (3) other security
or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the
CFTC or SEC (the "regulators"), may determine.261 The "trading ac-
count" of a banking entity is defined as (1) any account used to acquire or
take positions in securities or financial instruments principally for the
purpose of selling in the near term or otherwise with the intent to resell in
order to profit from short-term price movements, and (2) any other ac-
counts as the applicable regulators may determine. 262
The prohibition on proprietary trading, however, excludes (a) under-
writing and market-making activities to the extent such activities are de-
signed not to exceed the reasonably-expected near term demands of
clients, customers, or counterparties; (b) risk-mitigating hedging activities
that are designed to reduce specific risks to the banking entity in connec-
tion with and related to individual or aggregated positions, contracts, or
other holdings; (c) customer-driven investments; (d) investments in gov-
ernment and government-related obligations; and certain other permitted
activities. 263 These permitted activities will remain permitted as long as
they do not involve or result in a potential conflict of interest between the
banking entity and its clients, customers, or counterparties, or would pose
a threat to the safety and soundness of the banking entity or to the finan-
cial stability to the United States.264
Though it was strongly felt by Paul Volcker, Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, and others in the govern-
ment and the derivatives industry that the Volcker Rule effectively ad-
dresses risks and potential conflicts posed by banking organization's
proprietary trading in derivatives, Senator Lincoln believed that the Rule
does not go far enough to address the issue of risk in the nation's banking
sector and pushed hard for her amendment. 265 Together, the two provi-
sions will achieve the result desired for this legislation, which is to sub-
stantially limit the derivatives activities of insured depository institutions
prietary trading or acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership
interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund. Dodd-Frank Act
§ 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(13)).
260. Any insured depository institution or thrift, any company that controls an insured
depository institution or thrift, any company that is treated as a bank holding com-
pany under Section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or
subsidiary of such an entity. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1) (2010).
261. Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(13)(h)(4)).
262. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(13)(h)(6)).
263. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(13)(d)(1)).
264. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(13)(d)(2)(A)).
265. Edward Wyatt, In Tough Stance, Democrat Finds Few Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/politics/16derivatives.html.
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and their affiliates. Hence, a spun-off entity that is an affiliate of an in-
sured depository institution as well as any insured depository institution
that continues to engage in swap business (limited to permitted swaps)
would be equally subject to the Volcker Rule, and as a result, engage in
only limited swap activities. Further, in addition to satisfying the require-
ments set forth in the Act for swap dealers, the spun-off entity would also
be required to be independently capitalized so as to qualify as a partici-
pant in a clearing organization and to obtain credit rating that would give
confidence to counterparties to enter into transactions with the entity.
There is no doubt that losing the advantage of housing OTC derivatives
within the lead bank and "moving positions to a different subsidiary can
have material franchise, operational and, possibly, capital implications for
U.S. dealers." 266 The insured depository institutions providing capital to
spun-off entities would, in turn, find themselves in a tough situation, as it
would limit their ability to extend credit. In addition, in their effort to
find a cost-efficient solution to the situation, U.S. dealers might consider
moving their business to London-based regulated broker-dealer subsidi-
aries, which would not only take business away from the United States
but would also make it difficult and complex to unwind positions, thus
potentially increasing systemic risk.2 6 7 To avoid such a situation, it is im-
portant that serious work be done simultaneously to accomplish interna-
tional harmonization of rules and regulations concerning OTC
derivatives.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF TITLE VII FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, HEDGE
FUNDS, AND END USERS
1. Financial Institutions
Financial institutions that qualify as swap dealers, under the definition
of the Act, will have to register with the CFTC as swap dealers and with
the SEC as security-based swap dealers, within a year of the enactment of
the Act.26a As a swap dealer or security-based swap dealer, they will be
subject to minimum capital and margin requirements 269 They will also
be subject to reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and business
conduct standards in dealing with their counterparties and customers, and
"special entities". 270 Needless to say that as a result of the provisions of
the Act, the cost of using derivatives will increase. The provisions of the
new law are likely to impact liquidity in the market as capital will be
reserved and financial institutions will have to post initial and variation
margins for their trade positions. But the major change for financial insti-
tutions, that are also insured depository institutions, would come from
266. Alexander Yavorsky, Swaps Push-Out to Have Major Impact on U.S. Dealers,
COMPLIANCE WEEK, I (June 21, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/s/docu-
ments/MoodysPushOut.pdf.
267. Id. at 2.
268. Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. I §§ (4s)(a)(1), (c)(1)).
269. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. I (4s)(e)(1)(A)).
270. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. I (4s)(f)).
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the "swap push-out" provision, which prohibits "federal assistance" to
registered swap dealer and major swap participants. 2 7 1 These institutions
are allowed to continue as swap dealers to hedge their own activities and
enter into interest rate swaps as well as swaps referencing assets permit-
ted for investment by a national bank, and still remain eligible for "fed-
eral assistance." 2 7 2 But for all other swap activity, these institutions will
have to push-out their derivatives desk to a separately capitalized entity
(which may be an affiliate controlled by the same bank holding company)
that will be responsible for satisfying requirements for a swap dealer.2 7 3
In addition, the derivatives activities of financial institutions will be fur-
ther restricted under the Volcker Rule, which bans proprietary trading in
derivatives by "banking entities." 2 7 4
2. Hedge Funds
Hedge funds may qualify as "major swap participants," if their out-
standing swaps give rise to substantial counterparty exposure that has the
potential to adversely affect the financial stability of the U.S. banking
system or financial markets.2 7 5 If classified as a "major swap partici-
pant," they will be required to register with the appropriate agency, the
CFTC or the SEC, and be subject to capital and margin rules, reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, and business conduct standards, ex-
pected of such entities under the Act.2 7 6 Additionally, even if hedge
funds fail to meet the above noted criteria for MSPs, their swap transac-
tions will still be required to be cleared and executed on an exchange or a
swap execution facility, if they are a highly leveraged financial entity and
maintain a substantial position in outstanding swaps in a major cate-
gory. 2 7 7 Further, there is a possibility that funds entering into swaps may
be treated as commodity pools and their managers and advisors be sub-
jected to regulations as commodity pool operators and commodity trad-
ing advisors.278 If they fall under either of these classifications, they will
be required to register as a "commodity pool operator" (CPO) or "com-
modity trading advisor (CTA)," and subjected to disclosure, periodic re-
porting, audit, and other requirements under the Act.2 7 9 Until the
applicable rules and regulations are promulgated, there will not be any
clarity as to how each hedge fund will be categorized. There is no prob-
lem for those hedge funds that engage in large-scale derivatives trading
for they already have an understanding as to how they will be catego-
rized. For that matter, hedge funds with very small swap portfolio need
271. § 716(a).
272. § 716(d)(1)-(2).
273. See §§ 716, 731.
274. § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(13)).
275. 7 U.S.C. § la(33)(A)(ii) (2010).
276. Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 1 §§(4s)(a)( 2 ), (e), (f)).
277. 7 U.S.C. § la(33)(A)(iii)(I).
278. § la(10)(A)(i).
279. 7 U.S.C. § 6n(3)(A).
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not worry either. The dilemma is only for those who fall in the middle.
They are the ones who need to know how broad the new rules will be and
under the new rules, which category will they fall under. Going by the
tone of the legislation, it will probably be in their best interest to be pre-
pared for compliance with the new law.
3. Corporate End Users
Corporate end users, under the Act, are exempted from having to reg-
ister as a "major swap participant," and are thereby relieved from the
clearing, exchange trading, and possibly margin requirements, as long as
they enter into swap transactions to hedge their business risks.280 But,
the Act does provide them with the option to submit their trades for
clearing.281 If they choose not to opt for clearing of their trade, then the
Act does not provide any guidance as to whether they will be required to
post margin, even if noncash, in connection with such trade. It is impor-
tant to note that margin is required for all uncleared swaps and the Act
fails to provide explicit exemption from margin for business end users.
To address the growing concern about this issue, Senators Christopher
Dodd and Blanche Lincoln offered clarification in a letter dated June 30,
2010.282 In their letter, they emphasized that "[t]he legislation does not
authorize regulators to impose margin on end users, those exempt entities
that use swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk."2 8 3 The letter obvi-
ously is not legally binding and how much of an impact it will have on the
future rulemaking remains to be seen.2 8 4
Another area of concern for end users is the possibility that the risk-
mitigating swaps of large corporate end users might put them in the cate-
gory of "major swap participants," as the terms "substantial position,"
"substantial counterparty exposure," and "highly leveraged," used in the
definition of "major swap participants," have been left either unexplained
or to be defined by the Commissions. 2 8 5 Hence, until such time that the
Commissions provide guidance on this issue through detailed definitions,
end users, particularly highly leveraged financial entities not subject to
regulatory capital requirements and holding substantial position in out-
standing swaps in any major swap category, will be better off if they could
avoid holding large positions in outstanding swaps in any major swap cat-
egory. End users should also consider monitoring their status on a regu-
lar basis so that they understand where they stand as far as their being
classified as a "major swap participant" goes. Further, it is important for
280. Dodd-Frank Act § 763 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (3c)(g)(1)).
281. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a(3c)(g)(2)).
282. Dodd-Lincoln Letter, supra note 173.
283. Id.
284. The exemption from mandatory margin requirement for end users was removed
from the bill during the conference process. Policy Report: Derivatives Reform
Signed Into Law as Part of Dodd-Frank Legislation, REIT.com, July 22, 2010,
available at http://www.reit.com/PolicyPolitics/OtherFederalLegislation/Deriva-
tivesLegislation/NAREIT%2OPolicy%20Report%207-22-10.aspx.
285. Dodd-Frank Act §712(d)(1).
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end users to appreciate that because of the divided jurisdictions between
the CFTC and the SEC, entities who hold positions in both swaps and
security-based swaps, might find themselves being regulated by the two
Commissions as a "major swap participant" and a "major security-based
swap participant." 2 8 6
V. CONCLUSION
The financial crisis exposed weaknesses in the U.S. financial system
and led to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act to fix the flaws in the
weak system. The new legislation makes fundamental changes to the reg-
ulatory landscape to bring stability to the financial system and the econ-
omy. Most of the provisions of Title VII will be effective by July 16, 2011
(the "Effective Date"), which is 360 days after July 21, 2010, the date of
the enactment of the Act (the "Enactment Date"). Other provisions that
require additional rulemaking by different federal agencies will become
effective not less than 60 days after publication of the final rule or regula-
tion implementing such provision. This means that the derivatives mar-
ket and industry will not experience drastic changes overnight. But the
legislation will definitely get them thinking as to what their future course
of action is going to be now that the Act has been enacted. The Act
requires swap dealers and security-based swap dealers to register with the
CFTC and the SEC, respectively. Pursuant to registration, swap dealers
and major swap participants will be subject to increased capital and mar-
gin requirements, and heightened business conduct requirements. The
capital and margin requirements will not only increase transactions costs,
but will also affect liquidity in the market as the traders post initial mar-
gin and variation margin to keep up with changes in the values of posi-
tions. Most importantly, insured depository institutions that are part of
bank holding companies and are swap dealers will have to push-out their
swap trading desks to affiliates that are swap entities in order to remain
eligible for "federal assistance." Additionally, they will also be prohib-
ited from engaging in proprietary trading for their own accounts. These
key aspects of the derivatives legislation will influence the decision-mak-
ing of the derivatives participants to determine if they wish to continue
with their derivatives business and in what form.
Even though enactment of the Act has cleared some air and provided
some level of certainty, the full scope of the legislation will be known
only after the completion of rulemaking process and adoption of addi-
tional rules and regulations to implement the legislation. In fact, it would
not be farfetched to say that the success of this legislation will largely
depend on the rules to be written by the CFTC and the SEC. It is being
speculated that if the Commissions write stringent rules that end up creat-
ing a rigorous regulatory environment for the United States-based deal-
ers then it is possible that these dealers might move their OTC derivatives
286. §731(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. (4s)(c)).
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desks to their London-based regulated broker-dealer subsidiaries to take
advantage of regulatory arbitrage opportunities. But again, this specula-
tion is not very different from the speculation that arose after the enact-
ment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and which eventually fell flat.
But it is worth highlighting that the difference between the two Acts is
that the Dodd-Frank Act not only prohibits financial institutions from
engaging in proprietary trading on their own accounts, but also requires
them to push-out their swap trading desks to an affiliate. In this scenario,
these institutions have to find a home for their derivatives business and
when looking for it they might be tempted to take it to a place where the
regulatory environment is comparatively less severe. No doubt that mi-
gration of business to foreign markets would take these institutions out of
the reach of the U.S. regulators and will also affect U.S. competitiveness
in the global markets adversely. But such an outcome can be avoided if
the United States is successful in bringing about international harmoniza-
tion of rules impacting derivatives markets worldwide and remove any
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Given the global nature of the
OTC derivatives market and the cross-border impacts of the recent mar-
ket problems faced worldwide, achieving this would not be hard. Already
the Group of Twenty (G-20), 2m7 the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 288
and international standard setting bodies, such as International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),2 89 are pushing for global OTC
287. The Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was
established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and de-
veloping economies to discuss key issues in the global economy. About G-20, G-
20, http://www.g20.org/about what-is-g20.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
288. The FSB was established to coordinate the work of national financial authorities
and international standard setting bodies to develop and promote the implementa-
tion of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies in the
interest of international financial stability. The FSB is chaired by Mario Draghi,
Governor of the Bank of Italy. Its Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland, and
is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements. The FSB met in Seoul on
October 20, 2010, ahead of the G-20 summit and approved a report containing
recommendations to promote consistent implementation of the G-20 commitments
concerning: increasing the proportion of the market that is standardized; moving
to central clearing of OTC derivatives by (i) implementing mandatory clearing re-
quirements, (ii) strengthening oversight and regulation of central counterparties
(CCPs) and (iii) introducing robust risk management requirements for the remain-
ing non-centrally cleared markets; trading on exchanges or electronic platforms,
where appropriate, by asking IOSCO to complete an analysis by the end of Janu-
ary 2011; and ensuring that OTC derivatives transactions are reported to trade
repositories. About the FSB: Overview, FIN. STABILIT.y BiD., http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/aboutloverview.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2010);
Financial Stability Board Agree Tighter Watch Over Gib Financial Firms Ahead of
the G20 Summit in Seoul, AsyMieronix, Oct. 20, 2010, http://www.asymptotix.eu/
content/financial-stability-board-agree-tighter-watch-over-big-financial-firms-
ahead-g20-summit-seou.
289. IOSCO is recognized as the leading international policy forum for securities regu-
lators. It has formed a Task Force on OTC Derivatives Regulation (Task Force) in
order to coordinate securities and futures regulators' efforts to work together in
the development of supervisory and oversight structures related to OTC deriva-
tives markets. The purpose of the Task Force is to seek to develop consistent in-
ternational standards related to OTC derivatives regulation in the areas of
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derivatives reform by bringing consistency in international financial regu-
latory standards. Most major financial jurisdictions have expressed their
intent to align their efforts for reforms in their financial markets with the
reforms proposed under the Dodd-Frank Act. The European Commis-
sion's legislative proposal for a Regulation on OTC derivatives, central
counterparties and trade repositories, introduced on September 15, 2010,
is fairly close to the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.290 Likewise,
amendments were made to the Japanese Financial Instruments and Ex-
change Act (FlEA) in May 2010.291 The amended FIEA mirrors the
Dodd-Frank Act in many respects.292 With similar laws in place, major
financial markets overseas will not be a lucrative option for United
States-based dealers contemplating migration of their businesses.
Finally, there is no denying that OTC derivatives contracts serve a use-
ful function in helping businesses mitigate their risk and making capital
markets more efficient. Congress recognized that the elimination of the
OTC markets would cause more harm than good and did not ban use of
OTC derivatives. The Commissions, when crafting rules, should also
keep in mind that these markets are critical for financial innovation and
that the new rules should not have the effect of restricting innovation in
financial markets as it spurs economic growth.293 Though the Dodd-
Frank Act is a tough law, it is a constructive step in the right direction,
and the success of the financial reform process that has begun with the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act will be reflected in a safe and sound
financial system that fosters innovation.
clearing, trading, trade data collection and reporting, and the oversight of certain
market participants; to coordinate other international initiatives relating to OTC
derivatives regulation; and to serve as a centralized group within IOSCO through
which IOSCO members can consult and coordinate generally on issues relating to
OTC derivatives regulation. The Task Force will be led by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the UK
Financial Services Authority and the Securities and Exchange Board of India. Im-
plementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, FIN. STABILITY BD., 4, 64 (Oct. 25,
2010), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf; IOSCO
Forms Task Force on OTC Derivatives Regulation, CPIFINANCIAL, Oct. 26, 2010,
http://www.cpifinancial.net/V2/fa.aspx?v=0&aid=662&sec=lnvestment%20
Banking.
290. Proposal for a Regulation on OTC derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
Repositories, EUROPEAN COMM'N, 3 (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/fi-
nancial-markets/docs/derivatives/20100915_proposalen.pdf.
291. New Regulation of Derivatives in Japan, FIN. SERVS. AGENcy Gov'r OF JAPAN, 2
(2010), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_10
0510_fsag.pdf.
292. CFTC has prepared a detailed chart comparing Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act to
international legislation. See generally, Derivatives Reform: Comparison of Title
VII of the Dodd-Frank Act to International Legislation, U.S. COMMorITy Fu-
TURES TRADING COMM., (2010), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@news-
room/documents/speechandtestimony/gmac_100510-cftc2.pdf.
293. In fact, many important financial products, such as interest-rate swaps originated
in the OTC markets and "if mid-twentieth century regulation had precluded the
over-the-counter trading of derivatives, many important financial products would
not have developed." Duffie, supra note 95.
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